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Essay
The Efficiency of Summary Judgment
Edward Brunet*
Summary judgment provides several efficiencies essential to a
smoothly runninglitigationsystem. Perhaps the most importantfeature
of summary judgment is the "settlement premium " set forth in this
Essay. When a motion for summary judgment is denied, the nonmoving
party achieves a form of premium that enables a case to settle for an
additionalamount. Put simply, the settlement value of a case increases
when a motion for summary judgment is denied. Thus, denials of
summary judgment up the ante in the litigation game. This dynamic is
underappreciated by summary judgment critics who over-focus on
grants of summary judgment. The summary judgment premium would
disappear if a Rule 56 device was discouraged or eliminated and
possesses additional positive features. The possible denial of the
motion discourages weak orfrivolous requests. The substantialcost of
a summary judgment motion supplements the efficient deterrentvalue of
the summaryjudgment premium. A party will be reluctantto file a Rule
56 motion if the risk of loss is unacceptable. Other efficiencies make
summary judgment the single most useful pretrial device. Rule 56
efficiencies produce both clarification of the factual dispute and the
legal issues presented. Without summary judgment a case would
appear to be less certain, making settlement less likely. Summary
judgment motions also help jump start the involvement of the trial
judge, who until the motion might be the prototypical uninvolved
"umpire, " a relativelypassive participantin the litigationprocess and
one awaiting a call to a more active role in the case. A similar
'premium" should deter frivolous motions to dismiss. Once the motion
to dismiss is denied, the plaintiffshould demand a premium in the form
of enhanced considerationif the case is settled.
* Henry J. Casey Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School. I would like to thank Nick
Lawton and Jessie Young for their research assistance and Jeff Jones and Tamara Russell for their
comments. I also appreciate the comments made by the other participants at Seattle University
School of Law's summary judgment conference. Any errors, of course, are mine.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Critics argue that summary judgment is unconstitutional,' that
summary judgment is granted too frequently, 2 and that the civil
litigation system could survive without a dispositive motion like
summary judgment. 3 These negative voices appear to be gaining new
supporters 4 and are forcing proceduralists to reassess the inherent value
of summary judgment. This Essay evaluates the utility of the summary
judgment process. It identifies and explains the efficiencies triggered
by the filing of a Rule 56 motion, and, in so doing, it emphasizes
numerous positive features associated with the summary judgment
procedure. 5 Summary judgment is efficient.
To be sure, summary judgment motions are costly and must be linked
to the information needed to decide them. No discussion of summary
judgment costs and benefits can ignore the costs of discovery, an
expensive process necessary in the evaluation of summary judgment.
Nonetheless, the fear of losing a motion for summary judgment causes
an efficient "summary judgment premium," a sum added to the
settlement value of the case that is created by losing Rule 56 motions.
This premium acts as a helpful deterrent to the filing of frivolous or
baseless (and costly) summary judgment motions. Loss of a marginal
summary judgment motion essentially means that the tactical position of
the movant has been discounted or, put more crudely, that the loss has
"upped the ante." 6
1. Suja Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REv. 139, 140
(2007). But see Edward Brunet, Summary Judgment is Constitutional, 93 IOWA L. REv. 1625,
1627 (2008) (asserting that trial by inspection satisfies the right to jury trial because it pre-dated
1791).
2. See, e.g., Elizabeth Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Pre-Trial Practice: The
Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases. 158 U. PA. L. REV.
517, 518 (2010) (lamenting the alleged overuse of summary judgment in civil rights cases)
Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REv. 1897, 1898 (1998) (warning that
summary

judgment

can develop "into a stealth weapon for clearing calendars").

3. See John Bronsteen. Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 530 (2007)
(asserting that eliminating summary judgment would have no impact on either the speed of
litigation or the rate of settlement).
4. See, e.g.. Diane Wood, Summary Judgment and the Law of Unintended Consequences. 36
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 231. 243-44, 250 (2011) (arguing that summary judgment causes
overinvestment in discovery and the trial judge should use discretion to discourage it).
5. For the rare academic article praising summary judgment and advocating that the motion
become mandatory. see Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg. Solving the Nuisance Value
Settlement Problem: Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REV. 1849, 1853 (2004)
(advocating mandatory summary judgment, especially in class actions, to avoid inaccurate and
premature settlements).
6. 1 am indebted to Michael Kaufman. Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic
Affairs at Loyola University Chicago School of Law, for his insight that the process set forth here
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Summary judgment is capable of achieving other efficiencies. A
quick, introductory look at the impact of the opportunity to move for
summary judgment demonstrates that summary judgment critics have
overlooked the costs of making summary judgment unavailable and
have underrated the fairness and utility of the summary judgment ethos.
Summary Judgment's Fact ClarificationEffect
Summary judgment produces valuable fact clarification well before a
plenary trial, a significant efficiency. The nonmovant is essentially
forced to identify facts in the record that demonstrate issues of fact that
need to be tried. This "put up or shut up" 7 feature forces the nonmovant
and movant to advance cogent facts that either support or oppose
summary judgment. The Rule 56 motion essentially mandates the
pretrial production of facts by the party assigned the burden of
persuasion at trial.8
Summary Judgment's Law ClarificationEffect
Similarly, the availability of a summary judgment motion serves to
focus the lens upon pending legal issues. The motion can be granted
only where the movant is "entitled" to prevail under applicable legal
principles. 9 Unlike settlement, which operates in the "shadow of the
law," summary judgment is based upon application of strict rules of law
to a certain and settled set of facts.'o As nicely put by Randy J. Kozel
and David Rosenberg, the motion for summary judgment serves to
prevent the hearing of untenable legal claims.1 1
This efficiency is not to be confused with the motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The
motion operates upon a notion that decides pure legal issues that involve
no disputed facts whatsoever. The presence of any disputed facts in a

can be viewed as a discount.
7. My research assistant reports that this "put up" phrase has been used by federal courts 1235
times and by state court opinions 40 times. See, e.g., Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co.. 886 F.2d
1472, 1478 (6th Cir. 1989).
8. See generally Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (creating a burden shifting
dynamic by requiring a minimal showing by the movant who lacks the burden of persuasion and,
in contrast, imposing on the nonmovant who lacks the persuasion burden, usually the plaintiff, the
heavier burden of identifying proof that shows there are issues of fact for trial).
9.

See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

10. See EDWARD BRUNET & MARTIN REDISH. SUMMARY JUDGMENT: FEDERAL LAW AND
PRACTICE 22-28 (3d ed. 2006) (discussing and providing examples of "law summary judgment"
such as the statute of limitations or applicability of state action in constitutional litigation).
11. See Kozel & Rosenberg, supra note 5, at 1902.
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Rule 12(b)(6) context requires a speedy conversion of the motion to
dismiss into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment.12
The "Summary Judgment Premium "
Critics focus on the grants of a motion for summary judgment and
wrongly fail to assess a potentially efficient denial of summary
judgment.13 However, attention must be given to denials of summary
judgment in order to fully appreciate the positive impact of Rule 56.
The motion is often denied, and, when this occurs, the case becomes
more expensive to settle. In a very real sense, a summary judgment
premium arises at the time a Rule 56 motion is denied. When a motion
for summary judgment is denied, the settlement value of a claim
increases. This dynamic benefits the nonmovant, normally the plaintiff,
and should be more fully appreciated.
The Summary Judgment Premium Deters Frivolous Motions
The possibility of denial of the summary judgment motion and the
creation of a summary judgment premium play a valuable role in
deterring the filing of frivolous summary judgment motions. Filing the
motion activates the movant's risk of triggering a settlement premium.
Awareness of this possibility serves a useful function of deterring
frivolous costs.
The filing of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under
Rule 12(b)(6) is likely to create a similar settlement premium. There
appears little chance that the ante will not increase following the denial
of a motion to dismiss. Essentially, the denial of this motion means the
plaintiffs claim is theoretically possible. To survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." 14 A claim

12. See, e.g., Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1215-16 (10th Cir. 2007)
(affirming conversion of motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment): BRUNET &
REDISH, supra note 10, at 63-68 (discussing conversion of Rule 12(b)(6) motions to motions for
summary judgment). Celotex appropriately connected the dots between the nature and quantum
of proof needed to get to trial and the burden of persuasion. This connection is good policy and
was urged in leading articles by David Currie and Martin Louis. See Martin Louis. Federal
Summary Judgment Doctrine: A CriticalAnalysis, 83 YALE L.J. 745, 753-54 (1974) (proposing
reform for a party's burden of persuasion): David Currie. Thoughts on Directed Verdicts and
Summary Judgments. 45 U. CH. L. REV. 72. 72-79 (1977) (clarifying the relationship between
summary judgment and directed verdicts).
13. See, e.g.. D. Theodore Rave, Questioning the Efficiency ofSummary Judgment. 81 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 875. 875 (2006) ("[A]voiding trials reduces costs, but that savings is only realized when
the motion is granted.").
14. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
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has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.' 5 The plausibility standard is not akin
to a "probability requirement," but it asks for more than a sheer
16
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.
Where a complaint
pleads facts that are "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, it
"stops short of the line between possibility of 'entitle[ment] to relief."' 17
Summary Judgment Activates the TrialJudge By CreatingA Major
Event That Requires FocusedAttention
Other efficiencies spin from the maligned motion for summary
judgment. The prototypical passive judge' 8 is awakened and thrown
into heavy action by the filing of a Rule 56 motion. This characteristic
requires engagement of the assigned trial judge and, in so doing,
introduces an entity, the trial judge, who is capable of efficient judicial
action.
Related efficiencies associated with Rule 56 include holding a
pretrial event. This "event"-creation capability serves to drive or propel
a civil case. Cases need action as well as a call to action. The motion
for summary judgment is often the initial major event in a case. In a
very real sense, a summary judgment motion serves as a wake-up
"marker."
The judge who might be passively avoiding total
commitment to an assigned case can instantly find herself thrust into the
active phase of litigation.1 9 The nature of the claims and defenses
asserted by the disputants fail to emerge without the filing and
consideration of a motion for summary judgment. Once the motion is
filed, the litigation is transformed into a real dispute that is connected to
the parties. 2 0
The remainder of this Essay explores in more detail the efficiencies
described in the Introduction. Some of these procedures appear more
valuable and effective than others. On balance, Rule 56 represents a

15. Id. at 556.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 557.
18. See generally Marvin E. Frankel. The Searchfor Truth: An Umpireal View. 123 U. PA. L.
REv. 1031. 1035 (1975) (setting forth a model judge as a passive individual unwilling to take
charge of the case).
19. Id
20. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow. Whose Dispute 1s It Anyway?: A Philosophicaland
Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases). 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2665 (1995) (analyzing
the circumstances under which cases should be settled).
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valuable norm that advances disputes in a manner essential to case
management.

I.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRODUCES INVALUABLE
CLARIFICATION OF THE FACTS

Modern litigators live in the era of Ashcroft v. Iqbal2 1 and Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. 2 2 These cases have cast a sea of doubt
around the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and caused commentators to
reexamine summary judgment in the context of the major changes
created by these landmark pleading cases. 2 3 1 stress the word
"pleading" whenever focusing on these cases. These are mere pleading
cases that should be narrowly limited and only applied to the pleading
stage and should not be broadly read as changing summary judgment's
focus on the facts. Summary judgment should involve focus on mature
facts, often garnered in discovery. Once discovery has concluded, the
facts become close to settled, and the opportunity to file a motion for
summary judgment becomes tempting.
Only a full dress trial finds facts. Only summary judgment succeeds
in achieving a degree of factual clarification in the dominant pretrial
phase of litigation. These oversimplifications establish summary
judgment as a trial-like mechanism with the power to dismiss a case
where no factual issues exist and the substantive law supports the
moving party.
The beauty and efficiency of summary judgment lies in its flexibility
of timing. 24 Rule 56 procedure allows the movant a major dose of
discretion to file a summary judgment request when the facts become
clear. This open, textured attitude helps create a norm that sweeps the

21. 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (reaffirming the new "plausibility standard" to be used to assess
pleadings in Rule 12(b)(6) motions in all types of civil cases). For a view critical of this standard
see Edward Brunet, The Substantive Origins of PlausiblePleadings. 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
1, I (2010) (tracing the history of the word "plausible" and finding that the word appears to have
a substantive historical meaning that an antitrust claim "makes no economic sense").
22. 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (rejecting the Conley "beyond doubt" test, retaining the Conley notice
pleading standard, and mandating that a claim must be "plausible" to survive a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6)).
23. See, e.g.. Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become
(Disguised)Summary Judgments. 25 WASH U. J.L. & POL'Y 61, 62 (2007) (arguing that Twombly
involved a disguised summary judgment motion); Suja Thomas, The New Summary Judgment
Motion. The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK. L. REV. 15, 17
(2010) (emphasizing similar standards to assess summary judgment and motions to dismiss).
24. See generally Edward Brunet, The Timing of Summary Judgment, 198 F.R.D. 679, 680

(2001).
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various fruits of discovery into play and permits discovery to effectively
become fact, assuming no major factual issues are presented.
Judge Diane Wood has described summary judgment's requirement
that the nonmovant advance facts as a "put up or shut up moment" in a
lawsuit, the time "when a [nonmoving] party must show what evidence
it has" to enable it to convince the trier of fact. 25 The "put up"
reference in this time-worn clich6 clearly refers to a need to advance
facts in order to merit a trial, a mandate that seems reasonable. Without
additional proof backing one's case-the "put up" mandate-a party
faces a "shut up" procedure in the form of a dismissal of the case.
Of course, no procedure is cost-free, and summary judgment motions,
like all civil procedure norms, need to be assessed from a cost-benefit
point of view. In an important article, Judge Wood recently connected
the "put up or shut up" concept with investment in discovery. 2 6 She
reads the trilogy 2 7 as requiring the nonmoving party to (over)invest in
discovery in order to avoid summary judgment. 2 8 She also stresses that
summary judgment motions have excessive costs to both the parties and
the courts, and challenges the generally accepted wisdom that paints
Rule 56 as a cost-saving mechanism. In a surprisingly negative
assessment of summary judgment, Judge Wood concludes by urging
that counsel seek trial-judge approval before filing a summary judgment
motion, a seemingly radical idea that amounts to seeking permission to
evaluate whether a trial is really needed.2 9

Judge Wood's provocative and thoughtful analysis of summary
judgment merits careful reflection. Her specific suggestion requires the
moving party for summary judgment to seek prior judicial approval as a
condition of judicial consideration of a Rule 56 motion. This change
would, of course, add yet another layer of procedure to the costly and
complicated litigation process. This reform is not unlike a procedure
urged by the Manual for Complex Litigation, which grants the assigned
judge the discretion to hold a pretrial conference "to ascertain whether
25. See Koszola v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 385 F.3d 1104, 1111 (7th Cir. 2003). This phrase
appears to have been used first in Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co.. 886 F.2d 1472. 1479 (6th Cir.
1989). See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing usage of the phrase "put up or shut
up").
26. Wood. supra note 4, at 243-44 (noting that the connection between discovery costs and
discovery were "hardly touched upon at [a] Duke" University conference).
27. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
28. See Wood, supra note 4. at 240 ("[T]he stakes soared for the litigants, who learned quickly
that they had to redouble their investment in discovery so that they could present enough material
to avert an untimely demise of their cases.").
29. Id. at 250.
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issues are appropriate for summary judgment" and to decide whether
summary judgment would aid case termination. 30
Because summary judgment motions frequently have excessive costs,
Judge Wood's idea has value. Her concern for some means to counter
the rising costs of discovery seems accurate. Her new theory would
surely deter some summary judgment motions that should never see the
light of day. Nonetheless, it would surely be capable of over-deterring
Rule 56 requests that might otherwise be granted. The free-wheeling,
unpredictable nature of a plan to seek approval of a summary judgment
request seems problematic. The procedure advocated for this Rule 56
approval seems vague and difficult to implement with any degree of
precision. 3 1 Due process concerns appear legitimate in such an
undefined setting. 32 The effort to talk the court into receiving a
summary judgment motion seems bound to involve submissions of
proof. Careful counsel will likely request that these early conferences
be more formal than may be desirable; it is not unlikely that the
(putative) moving party will want a court reporter present to
memorialize the position of a judge and other informed adversaries. It
is ironic that the proposal advanced by a very respected judge should be
rejected because of its intentionally informal nature. I stress that the
cost of this procedure appears excessive and the risk of inaccurate
conclusions seems troubling.

III.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROCEDURE CLARIFIES QUESTIONS OF LAW
AND PROVIDES CRUCIAL PRETRIAL Focus ON THE LEGAL ISSUES
PRESENTED BY THE LITIGATION

Just as a Rule 56 motion helps to clarify facts, summary judgment
also aids clarification of the law. The nonexistence of factual issues
will not, of course, dispose of a case. A pending civil suit can be
terminated only if legal principles demonstrate that a party should
prevail. In other words, summary judgment, like plenary trial itself,
involves a dual emphasis on facts and law. The phrase "entitled to
judgment as a matter of law" is not a mantra and strictly mandates the
denial of the motion unless the law unambiguously supports the moving
party. 33

30. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 11.34 (4th ed. 2008).
31. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348-49 (1976) (requiring a form of due
process that leads to precise and accurate results).
32. See id at 345-46 (connecting accuracy values and due process fairness).
33. See, e.g., BRUNET & REDISH, supra note 10, § 2.2(a).
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Summary judgment can represent a battle that exclusively regards
facts. The import of legal norms is sometimes overlooked in this effort
to determine if issues of fact are presented. My point is straightforward:
the requirement that the movant be entitled to judgment as a matter of
law provides a reality check to the disputants and a valuable message to
the judge.
While the need for clarification of legal issues by more particular
pleadings has clearly been enhanced by the "plausible pleading"
requirement of Twombly and its progeny, a motion for summary
judgment provides a superior and more accurate post-pleading inquiry
into whether a claim is supported by substantive law. This look at the
law seems far more advanced than that provided by the motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim and suggests that summary
judgment's requirement for legal support enhances a productive
examination of whether the claim or the defense is legally supported. In
essence, the summary judgment assessment should determine whether
the legal claim challenged is legally tenable. 34

IV. SUMMARY JUDGMENT CONSIDERATION FACILITATES SETTLEMENT
BY CREATING A "SETTLEMENT PREMIUM" AND ADVANCING CERTAINTY
The motion for summary judgment also aids settlement in several
different ways. Its production of both facts and relevant legal norms
increases decisional certainty. As certainty increases, the parties are
able to more accurately assess the risks of trial. Settlements tend to
occur when the disputants see the handwriting on the wall and are
guided by a clear sense of what will likely happen at a full trial. 35
Discovery, of course, promotes gathering of facts that will contribute to
certainty.
Many commentators note that uncertainty deters settlement. 36 A
quick look at this axiom from the perspective of both contingent-fee
plaintiffs' attorneys and insurance defense counsel provides useful
insights. The work environment of the plaintiffs' attorney can be
characterized as "a world of contingency or the likely," where a
quantum of uncertainty exists. 3 7 These litigators would "refer out" or
34. See Kozel & Rosenberg, supra note 5, at 1902.
35. See, e.g.. EDWARD BRUNET, CHARLES B. CRAVER & ELLEN E. DEASON. ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ADVOCATE'S PERSPECTIVE 76-77 (4th ed. 2011).
36.

See, e.g., ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

85-87 (2003) (explaining how the parties' divergent expectations regarding the risks of trial will
frustrate settlement and how similar expectations of results will normally lead to settlement).
37. See Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Plaintifs' Lawyers: Dealing With the Possible But
Not Certain, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 337, 344 (2011) (asserting that plaintiffs' attorneys work in a
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decline representation in the context of a "truly uncertain or random"
dispute with excessive risk of loss. 38 Put differently, Stephen Daniels
and Joanne Martin term this scenario as "contingent" and define this
world as "knowable but not predictable." 39
The calculus of assessing a case from the defending party's
perspective is not dissimilar. Counsel for the defendant assesses risk
carefully but often with the potential advantage of possessing
asymmetric information, particularly when the representation is
financed by an insurance company, a firm usually data-rich and in the
business of collecting and analyzing information. Like plaintiffs'
attorneys, the presence of a modest amount of risk may lead a defense
attorney to a decision to settle, but I acknowledge that "uncertainty can
be a prime driver of settlements." 40
Consider the task of a mediator assigned to help resolve a complex
case without the motion for summary judgment. Without Rule 56, the
parties neglect to point to or prepare for a significant event in the case, a
consideration of a motion for summary judgment. The mediator has
very little material to prepare and inform him regarding the nature of the
case. The presence of both Iqbal and contrasting Rule 12(b)(6) cases
fail to satisfy the judge's desire for additional information. Mediation
briefs might help inject useful information into the case but are often
capable of creating further factual uncertainty. A litigating universe
lacking summary judgment makes the mediator's job harder by forcing
the mediator to prepare and assess the case in a way not that different
from summary judgment. Because the assessment is prepared by the
mediator-someone unfamiliar with the legal and factual questions
presented in the case-the cost of the mediation will increase
substantially. Put differently, the incentives and information advantages
held by the disputing parties would be lost in a summary-judgment-free
world.
Failure to have a summary judgment process has a different cost: the
lack of a "settlement premium." The denial of a summary judgment
request seems to set up a real probability that the case will proceed to a
risky and costly trial. What this effectively does is to help the plaintiff
collect a greater dollar amount than would be possible without the
motion.
world of contingency where results are uncertain but provide enough chance that a plaintiffs
representative will take a case and the accompanying risk of loss).
38. Id. at 337-38.
39. Id.
40. Howard M. Erichson, Uncertainty and the Advantage of Collective Settlement, 60
DEPAUL L. REv. 627, 643 (2011).
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The flip side of a summary judgment process is that the parties
should avoid filing a likely-to-lose Rule 56 motion. Losing activates
the "settlement premium" described above. The prudent defendant has
the incentive to file only Rule 56 motions that are probable winners to
avoid paying this premium. These dynamics efficiently deter the filing
of any low-quality summary judgment motions and make attorneys
appropriately cautious regarding the filing of a summary judgment
request. The availability of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim merits consideration and comparison regarding a
possible "premium."
If the motion to dismiss is denied, will a
"premium" similar to the summary judgment premium be created? This
question appears speculative and rests upon an uncertain foundation.
The denial of a motion to dismiss often validates that the claimant
possesses a valid legal theory, which means that the mere presence of
some or even one issue of fact will prevent pretrial dismissal of the
case. Yet, the impact of the outright denial of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is
surely less than a summary judgment motion because of the disability of
the former to decide issues of fact and the ability of a summary
judgment to provide a measure of factual certainly.
V. SUMMARY JUDGMENT FACILITATES SETTLEMENT BY PROVIDING A
HELPFUL MARKER TO "HOLD AN EVENT"

Throughout the United States, numerous courts hold events to
provide the parties with an opportunity to settle a case. Sometimes
called "settlement days," these events force the parties to at least meet
and confer about possible alternatives to trial. Typically, these events
are the primary focus of the judge who sponsors the chosen settlement
effort, and trials are placed on hold during the period dominated by the
peacemaking opportunity. Some courts hold "Mediation Week" by
deputizing many lawyers and judges as alleged "mediators" in an effort
to clear dockets using mass-production techniques.
Heavy reliance on summary judgment's "killer motion" character has
led some judges and commentators to question the fairness of Rule 56.
Summary judgment is assumed by these critics to be too common and
frequent, particularly in civil rights cases. 4 1 While it is true that the
Rule 56 motion acts to rid the docket of many civil rights cases, the
prevailing data commissioned by the Federal Judicial Center fails to
41. See, e.g., Elizabeth Schneider, The Dangersof Summary Judgment: The DisparateImpact
on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 517, 519 (2010)
(arguing that changes to federal pretrial practice stemming from recent Supreme Court decisions
have led to a disproportionate number of dismissals in cases dealing with civil rights and
employment discrimination).
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support the mythology that summary judgment grants or motions are a
routine feature of every case. A respected Federal Judicial Center
empirical study of summary judgment activity found that the motion is
only made in 17 of every 100 cases terminated, hardly a filing rate
descriptive of procedural overuse. 4 2
VI. SUMMARY JUDGMENT INSERTS THE PASSIVE TRIAL JUDGE INTO THE
LITIGATION
Commentators assert that the typical adversary-model trial judge is
passive and similar to an umpire. 43 Judge Marvin Frankel describes the
typical judge as "ignorant and unprepared" and describes these words as
"axioms of the system." 44 Rather than taking charge of a case and
aggressively administering the litigation, the mythological adversarymodel trial judge waits for the parties to provide a spur to action. 4 5
This characterization of a judge as lacking information while also
passive appears structurally sound. The adversary parties "own" their
dispute and the judge is a latecomer to the dispute and the relevant
information surrounding it. Until there is motion activity in a civil case,
the judge may not have any reason to become familiar with the facts or
circumstances relevant to the case and is positioned far behind the
parties and their attorneys in the knowledge of the factual issues.
The trial judge is essentially "out of it" and is distanced from the
parties and the core of the dispute. I have theorized about this problem
of the passive and comparatively under-informed judge and even
graphed the court's position as outside the "triangle of negotiation," a
situs desired by litigation protagonists.

42. JOE S. CECIL. DEAN P. MILETICH & GEORGE CORT, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.. TRENDS IN
SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRACTICE: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 3 (2001), available at
http://www.law.umich.edu/facultyhome/margoschlanger/Documents/Resources/Sources Datasets
AmericanTrialTrends/TrendsSummaryJudgment PracticePreliminaryAnalysis.pdf.
43. See, e.g.. Frankel. supra note 18, at 1042-43 (1975) (asserting that the adversary system
fails to permit effective judicial intervention regarding factual issues).
44. Id. at 1042.
45. See Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARv. L. REv. 374, 400-02 (1982) (asserting
that federal judges in the adversary model often do take charge of a dispute assigned to them in a
fashion both authorized by Rule 16 and in a manner consistent with the investigative model of
adjudication).

2012]

The Efficiency of Summary Judgment

701

Graph #1: The Typical Judge
Judge

I

11

-*A

Consider this graph depicting the negotiation between the parties 1
and A. Note the structural position of the trial judge who is distant from
the fray and in a weak position to aid the settlement process. Something
needs to happen to activate the court that supposedly is a "judicial
manager."
The weakness of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and the Rule
12(e) motion for a more definite statement has helped create a powerful
version of summary judgment. These motions have been so difficult to
grant that litigators are deterred when considering filing either a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim or a motion for a more definite
statement. Today's judges understand these truths quite well and have
understandably turned to summary judgment as a potentially utilitarian,
dispositive tool.
The landmark Celotex Corp. v. Catrett decision clearly authorized a
degree of summary judgment activism by its burden shifting mechanic
and its unambiguous and gratuitous blessing of sua sponte summary
judgment.4 6 The latter procedure arms the trial judge with the unbridled
discretion to raise the propriety of summary judgment in a manner that
resembles the inquisition model of judging rather than the adversary

46.

477 U.S. 317, 323 26 (1986).
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model.4 7 Yet, the discretion to entertain and suggest Rule 56 motions
sua sponte has clear limits.
The success of and respect afforded the Manual of Complex
Litigation provides further evidence that today's judge is not typically
passive and, instead, is now authorized to assert control over the
disputants and their attorneys. The Manual is popular with federal
judges because it sets forth a roadmap guide to facilitating
administration of a so-called complex case.
Summary judgment
procedure plays a major role in the Manual's treatment of complex
litigation. The text of the current Manual extols the ability of summary
judgment to eliminate factual issues and "reduce the scope of discovery
and trial." 48 The Manual also appropriately quotes the Celotex
opinion's effort to rehabilitate the motion for summary judgment by
asserting that a Rule 56 motion is "not . . . a disfavored procedural

shortcut, but rather ... an integral part of the Federal Rules." 49
VII. CONCLUSION
Summary judgment, like any litigation procedure, possesses both
benefits and costs. Recent evaluation of the summary judgment device
sets forth a long litany of worries concerning modern Rule 56 usage.
Critics of the summary judgment mechanism emphasize the relationship
between the high costs of discovery and the need to use discovery when
filing a Rule 56 motion. Judge Wood has recently written that summary
judgment is to blame for the rise of discovery costs and now is on
record as questioning the efficiency of summary judgment. Other
summary judgment critics opine that summary judgment is granted too
often, which denies access to justice. Alternatively, others assert that
efficient case processing could exist without summary judgment and
offer a litigation landscape that they think could operate just as well
without the motion.
This Essay highlights several positive features of summary judgment
that critics appear to have overlooked. The list of efficient effects that
derive from summary judgment is impressive. Summary judgment
provides fact clarification, an important feature of any decision making
context, including case adjudication.
Without clear information,
adversaries cannot make rational decisions. The "put up or shut up"
nature of the burden-shifting responsibility achieves a useful dose of
47. See W. Zeidler. Evaluation of the Adversary System: As Comparison, Some Remarks on
the InvestigatorySystem ofProcedure,85 AUSTL. L.J. 390, 394-96 (1981).
48.

MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 30,

49.

Id; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327.
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facts essential to case evaluation. Similarly, summary judgment also
injects legal analysis through its requirement that the moving party
show that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The ability of the
parties or court to assess law as well as fact prior to a plenary trial is
central to all of litigation and an indispensible characteristic of
procedure theory. Summary judgment motions provide a means for a
party to achieve a pretrial look at a dispute to ensure that the law
supports the claim or defense pleaded.
Without summary judgment, the pretrial assessment of a case would
be highly unpredictable and haphazard. A litigant would lack the means
to formalize a judge's pretrial evaluation of the strength of a case.
While case assessment can occur unilaterally by the client and the
attorney, the evaluation of a case by a judge has far greater impact and
formal value.
Elimination of a means to provide a potentially
dispositive case assessment before trial comes at a very high cost and
runs counter to settlement theory.
Perhaps the most important feature of summary judgment is the
"settlement premium" set forth in this Essay. When a motion for
summary judgment is denied, the nonmoving party achieves a form of
premium that enables a case to settle for an additional amount. Put
simply, the settlement value of a case increases when a motion for
summary judgment is denied. Denial of summary judgment motions up
the ante in the litigation game. Summary judgment critics would likely
disappear if a Rule 56 device is discouraged or eliminated.
The summary judgment premium has additional positive features.
The possible denial of the motion discourages weak or frivolous
requests. The cost of a summary judgment motion supplements the
deterrent value of the summary judgment premium. A party will be
reluctant to file a Rule 56 motion if the risk of loss is unacceptable.
I conclude on a quantitative note. Numerous critics of summary
judgment overemphasize the grant of a rule 56 motion and contend that
the grant rate of summary judgment is somehow too high. These
summary judgment hawks ignore the powerful impact of a denial of a
motion for summary judgment. The deterrence impact of the risk of
losing the motion causes weak or risky summary judgment requests to
be placed on the cutting-room floor. A focus on only motion grants
distorts the story. Rational defendants and their counsel are likely to
file only high-quality Rule 56 motions. This may explain why grant
rates are higher than anticipated. Failure to prevail when moving for
summary judgment carries a high price: the summary judgment
premium, which is payment owed to the nonmoving party because of
exposure to the risk of trial.

